AWS Permissions: What the Spotto Role Can Read
An IAM role with AWS's ViewOnlyAccess and SecurityAudit policies, plus a small read policy for cost and optimisation APIs. The exact policy documents are in the CloudFormation templates, in Review Permissions on the connect page, and in the role instructions from Manual Setup. Deploy those rather than copying JSON from this page.
Policies At A Glance
| Policy | Kind | Accounts | Grants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trust policy | Every account | sts:AssumeRole for Spotto's principal, only with your External ID | |
ViewOnlyAccess | AWS managed | Every account | Resource inventory and metadata across services |
SecurityAudit | AWS managed | Every account | Security configuration |
SpottoReadOnlyAccess | Inline | Every account | Cost and optimisation reads the managed policies don't include, plus a deny on data and secret reads. See below. |
SpottoBillingExportRead | Inline | The account that stores the export | List and read the export folder only. See billing export access. |
SpottoExistingBillingExportRead | Inline | The account that stores an existing export | The same reads for an existing export, added by Grant Access to Export. |
SpottoCommitmentsPlanning | Inline | The management or standalone account | Reserved Instance and Savings Plans reads. See commitments planning. |
Trust Policy
The trust policy is one statement: sts:AssumeRole from Spotto's AWS principal, with the condition sts:ExternalId. Your External ID starts with spotto-, is the same for all of your accounts and never changes.
What Spotto Reads, And What It Never Reads
AWS Managed Policies
| Policy | ARN | Covers |
|---|---|---|
| ViewOnlyAccess | arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccess | Lists and describes resources across services, much like Azure Reader |
| SecurityAudit | arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/SecurityAudit | Reads security configuration, much like Azure Security Reader |
AWS maintains both and adds new services over time, so new data Spotto collects rarely needs a role change. Spotto reviews each new version of these policies before relying on it, and checks the attached versions on every scan.
SpottoReadOnlyAccess
A small inline policy. It allows only the reads the managed policies don't include, and denies data and secret reads they would otherwise allow.
What It Adds
| Service | For |
|---|---|
| Cost Explorer | Costs, forecasts and rightsizing |
| Compute Optimizer | Rightsizing recommendations |
| Resilience Hub | Resilience assessments |
| Well-Architected | Workload reviews |
| Trusted Advisor | Recommendations |
| Savings Plans | Commitment inventory |
| Resource Explorer | Resource search |
| Data Exports | Finding your billing exports and whether AWS has delivered their files (ListExports, GetExport, ListExecutions), metadata only |
| IAM Identity Center, Lambda | User and group details, Lambda aliases |
What It Denies
An explicit deny overrides both managed policies.
| Data | Denied actions |
|---|---|
| Secrets and parameters | secretsmanager:GetSecretValue, secretsmanager:BatchGetSecretValue, ssm:GetParameter, ssm:GetParameters, ssm:GetParameterHistory, ssm:GetParametersByPath, ssm:GetAutomationExecution |
| Keys and secrets inside configuration | ec2:DescribeVpnConnections, directconnect:DescribeVirtualInterfaces, glue:GetConnections, cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolClient, cognito-idp:DescribeIdentityProvider, appsync:ListApiKeys, apigateway:GET, cloudfront:GetDistribution, cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig, cloudfront:ListDistributions, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByWebACLId, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByRealtimeLogConfig, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByAnycastIpListId, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByConnectionMode |
| Instance passwords and console output | ec2:GetPasswordData, ec2:GetConsoleOutput, ec2:GetConsoleScreenshot |
| Launch configuration user data | autoscaling:DescribeLaunchConfigurations |
| Database logs and queries | rds:DownloadDBLogFilePortion, rds:DownloadCompleteDBLogFile, redshift:ViewQueriesInConsole |
| Saved queries, scripts and code | cleanrooms:GetAnalysisTemplate, cleanrooms:GetCollaborationAnalysisTemplate, cleanrooms:BatchGetCollaborationAnalysisTemplate, cleanrooms:GetProtectedQuery, cleanrooms:PreviewPrivacyImpact, logs:DescribeQueries, logs:DescribeQueryDefinitions, quicksight:DescribeDataSet, quicksight:DescribeAnalysis, quicksight:DescribeDashboard, quicksight:DescribeTemplate, appsync:ListResolvers, appsync:ListResolversByFunction, appsync:ListFunctions, appsync:GetChannelNamespace, appsync:ListChannelNamespaces, cloudfront:GetFunction, sagemaker:DescribeNotebookInstanceLifecycleConfig, sagemaker:DescribeStudioLifecycleConfig, sagemaker:DescribeHumanTaskUi, ssm:GetDocument, ssm:ListCommands, ssm:DescribeAutomationExecutions, ssm:DescribeAutomationStepExecutions, codecommit:ListFileCommitHistory, cloudformation:GetTemplate, lambda:GetFunction |
| AI prompts, agents and memory | bedrock:GetPrompt, bedrock:GetAgent, bedrock:GetAgentVersion, bedrock:GetAgentCollaborator, bedrock:GetFlow, bedrock:GetFlowVersion, bedrock:GetExecutionFlowSnapshot, bedrock:GetKnowledgeBaseDocuments, bedrock-agentcore:GetEvaluator, bedrock-agentcore:GetHarness, bedrock-agentcore:GetMemory, bedrock-agentcore:GetRegistryRecord, bedrock-agentcore:GetConfigurationBundle, bedrock-agentcore:GetConfigurationBundleVersion, bedrock-mantle:CallWithBearerToken, qapps:GetQApp, qbusiness:ListDocuments |
| Messages and contact-centre data | lex:GetUtterancesView, chime:ListChannelMessages, connect:ListRealtimeContactAnalysisSegments, connect:ListRealtimeContactAnalysisSegmentsV2, connect:ListContactReferences, connect:ListDataTableValues, connect:ListDataTablePrimaryValues, mobiletargeting:GetCampaigns, mechanicalturk:ListHITs |
| Documents, datasets, traces and exports | sagemaker:DescribeModelCard, rekognition:ListDatasetEntries, cognito-sync:ListRecords, s3vectors:GetVectors, s3vectors:ListVectors, s3vectors:QueryVectors, xray:GetTraceSummaries, xray:BatchGetTraces, datapipeline:QueryObjects, datapipeline:DescribeObjects, datapipeline:EvaluateExpression, codepipeline:GetJobDetails, codepipeline:GetThirdPartyJobDetails, quicksight:DescribeAssetBundleExportJob, quicksight:DescribeDashboardSnapshotJobResult, devicefarm:ListArtifacts, devicefarm:ListTestGridSessionArtifacts |
| Security incident cases | security-ir:GetCase, security-ir:ListCaseEdits, security-ir:ListComments, security-ir:GetCaseAttachmentDownloadUrl |
| Account contact details | account:GetPrimaryEmail, account:GetAlternateContact, account:GetContactInformation |
| Cognito user lists | cognito-idp:ListUsers, cognito-idp:ListUsersInGroup |
Spotto still reads metadata, such as secret names, rotation dates and parameter names.
The deny wins over everything else on the role, including security framework assessments. A framework check that would need one of these reads shows as not assessed rather than widening the role.
Neither managed policy grants data reads, so the role also can't read CloudWatch log events, DynamoDB items, Kinesis records, SQS messages, ECR image layers or S3 objects outside the billing export folder.
What Stays Readable
Two kinds of configuration can hold secrets and remain readable, because the scan uses the APIs that return them:
| Data | Returned by |
|---|---|
| EC2 user data | ec2:DescribeInstanceAttribute and ec2:DescribeLaunchTemplateVersions |
| Lambda environment variables | lambda:ListFunctions |
Don't store secrets in either. Use Secrets Manager or Parameter Store, which the role can't read.
Two reads are worth knowing about:
account:GetAccountInformationshows the native account name, creation date and state.iam:GenerateCredentialReportcounts as a write in AWS, but only starts an IAM credential report. It never creates or changes credentials.
S3 Objects
| Role deployed with | S3 object reads |
|---|---|
| The hosted templates (Launch Stack, CloudShell, Terraform) | No policy grants object reads outside the billing export folder. Neither managed policy grants s3:GetObject. |
| Role instructions from Manual Setup | SpottoReadOnlyAccess also denies s3:GetObject* outside the billing export folder. Replace the whole policy when billing changes, because the deny's exception changes with it. |
Billing Export Access
SpottoBillingExportRead goes on the account that stores the export. For an existing export, Grant Access to Export adds the same reads as SpottoExistingBillingExportRead:
| Action | Scope |
|---|---|
s3:GetBucketLocation | The bucket |
s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration | The bucket; preflight must read its encryption settings before accepting a new or changed source. |
s3:ListBucket | Only the delivery folder, <prefix>/<export name>, or the name alone without a prefix |
s3:GetObject | Files in that folder |
kms:Decrypt, kms:DescribeKey | Only the billing export's KMS key, and only when the export uses one. The key policy must also allow the role. |
A legacy CUR also needs cur:DescribeReportDefinitions, which the role instructions add for its definition account. None of these permissions can create, change or delete exports, buckets or keys.
Before the first delivery, Spotto uses iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy on the storage role to check object-read grants and, for a customer-managed SSE-KMS key, key-decrypt grants. The bucket's encryption configuration must be readable and the actual key must resolve through read-only lookups; leaving the key field blank does not skip that check. An AWS-managed S3 key must already exist. Only the account's exact regional aws/s3 key can use the AWS-managed exception. Its decryption simulation rejects a simulated explicit deny; an implicit identity-policy deny can rely on the key's S3-mediated policy only when no Organizations or permissions-boundary restriction is reported. A reported restriction is inconclusive and blocks acceptance. Known S3 service and caller-account context is supplied; missing required simulation context blocks acceptance.
Simulation establishes policy readiness only. It doesn't prove access through S3 bucket policies, KMS key policies, resource control policies or VPC endpoint policies. A read of a delivered object tests actual access. See billing preflight.
Commitments Planning
SpottoCommitmentsPlanning is always on the role in the management or standalone account deployed by the templates. With Manual Setup, it's added where you select Organization Commitments Planning.
| Action | Why |
|---|---|
organizations:DescribeOrganization | Confirm the organization's identity |
savingsplans:DescribeSavingsPlans, ec2:DescribeReservedInstances | Commitment inventory |
ce:GetSavingsPlansCoverage, ce:GetSavingsPlansUtilization, ce:GetReservationCoverage, ce:GetReservationUtilization | Coverage and utilization |
ce:GetSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendation, ce:GetReservationPurchaseRecommendation | Purchase recommendations |
ce:StartSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendationGeneration, ce:ListSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendationGeneration | Refresh Savings Plans recommendations |
AWS classes StartSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendationGeneration as a write, because it starts a new calculation. It doesn't buy a Savings Plan or change a commitment. AWS allows it up to three times a day per billing family.
SpottoReadOnlyAccess also includes ce:GetCostForecast, for native cost forecasts, and ce:GetDimensionValues, to qualify Savings Plan types.
Optional Storage Inventory Report Access
Storage Inventory assessment reads an existing S3 Inventory report. It doesn't read your application objects or create an Inventory configuration. It's not in the standard role, so add it in the tool that owns the role:
| Permission | Scope |
|---|---|
s3:GetInventoryConfiguration | The source bucket |
s3:ListBucket | Limited by s3:prefix to the report's destination folder |
s3:GetObject | Only that folder's manifests and report data |
kms:Decrypt | The exact key, if the report uses SSE-KMS. The key policy must allow the role. |
A report in another account's bucket also needs that bucket's policy to allow the role. For a role from Manual Setup, also add the report folder to the S3 deny's exception: a separate Allow can't override a deny. Never grant broad object reads.
Update An Existing Role
| Role deployed with | How to update |
|---|---|
| The hosted templates | See update and repair: rerun the CloudShell command, update the stack, or bump the Terraform module. |
| A downloaded template | Download the account's new template and update its stack. |
| Manual IAM | Generate the role instructions again and replace each policy. |
A role missing ViewOnlyAccess or SecurityAudit shows Update Available or Repair Access. Update the stack, or attach the missing policy to a manual role. If an older role has AWS ReadOnlyAccess attached, detach it once the current policies work: it grants much broader reads, including S3 objects.
What Can Still Block Access
An IAM Allow never overrides an explicit deny. Resource control policies (RCPs), service control policies (SCPs), permissions boundaries, S3 bucket policies and KMS key policies can all stop Spotto even when the role is correct. See the trust policy diagram.
Scope any exception to the exact SpottoReadOnlyRole ARNs rather than relaxing the control for everyone. Spotto reports denied reads per account, so you can see what's affected.
Spotto Portal Permissions Are Separate
AWS IAM controls what Spotto can read. Spotto permissions control who in your company can see the data and manage cloud accounts. See access and permissions.