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AWS Permissions: What the Spotto Role Can Read

An IAM role with AWS's ViewOnlyAccess and SecurityAudit policies, plus a small read policy for cost and optimisation APIs. The exact policy documents are in the CloudFormation templates, in Review Permissions on the connect page, and in the role instructions from Manual Setup. Deploy those rather than copying JSON from this page.

Policies At A Glance​

Three read-only levels. 1 Required, in every account: the trust policy with your External ID, the AWS managed ViewOnlyAccess and SecurityAudit policies, and SpottoReadOnlyAccess, which adds cost and optimisation reads and denies data reads. It unlocks resource inventory, configuration and tags, utilization metrics, Security Hub, GuardDuty and Inspector evidence, Cost Explorer, Compute Optimizer and Trusted Advisor insights, recommendations and the native account name. 2 Required, only where the export is defined and stored: SpottoBillingExportRead, for cost history, billed and amortized cost per resource, and cost analysis and savings across accounts; the first delivery takes up to 24 hours. 3 Optional, usually only the management account: SpottoCommitmentsPlanning, for Reserved Instance and Savings Plans inventory, coverage, utilization and purchase recommendations; it starts a Savings Plans recommendation calculation but never buys. Write-back is not available during the preview: no changes to resources, no applied recommendations, no purchases.Three read-only levels. 1 Required, in every account: the trust policy with your External ID, the AWS managed ViewOnlyAccess and SecurityAudit policies, and SpottoReadOnlyAccess, which adds cost and optimisation reads and denies data reads. It unlocks resource inventory, configuration and tags, utilization metrics, Security Hub, GuardDuty and Inspector evidence, Cost Explorer, Compute Optimizer and Trusted Advisor insights, recommendations and the native account name. 2 Required, only where the export is defined and stored: SpottoBillingExportRead, for cost history, billed and amortized cost per resource, and cost analysis and savings across accounts; the first delivery takes up to 24 hours. 3 Optional, usually only the management account: SpottoCommitmentsPlanning, for Reserved Instance and Savings Plans inventory, coverage, utilization and purchase recommendations; it starts a Savings Plans recommendation calculation but never buys. Write-back is not available during the preview: no changes to resources, no applied recommendations, no purchases.
PolicyKindAccountsGrants
Trust policyEvery accountsts:AssumeRole for Spotto's principal, only with your External ID
ViewOnlyAccessAWS managedEvery accountResource inventory and metadata across services
SecurityAuditAWS managedEvery accountSecurity configuration
SpottoReadOnlyAccessInlineEvery accountCost and optimisation reads the managed policies don't include, plus a deny on data and secret reads. See below.
SpottoBillingExportReadInlineThe account that stores the exportList and read the export folder only. See billing export access.
SpottoExistingBillingExportReadInlineThe account that stores an existing exportThe same reads for an existing export, added by Grant Access to Export.
SpottoCommitmentsPlanningInlineThe management or standalone accountReserved Instance and Savings Plans reads. See commitments planning.

Trust Policy​

1 Spotto, using its own AWS identity, asks AWS to assume SpottoReadOnlyRole in your account and sends your External ID. The role's trust policy allows only Spotto, and only with your External ID. You never create access keys or share credentials. 2 AWS returns temporary credentials and Spotto checks they belong to the expected account. 3 Spotto makes read-only calls for resources, metrics, security findings and billing files. An explicit deny always wins over the role: a resource control policy can block the assume itself; a service control policy can block reads but never the assume, because Spotto is outside your organization; a permissions boundary caps what the role can do; and S3 bucket and KMS key policies must allow the role when another account owns the billing bucket, or the files use a customer-managed KMS key.1 Spotto, using its own AWS identity, asks AWS to assume SpottoReadOnlyRole in your account and sends your External ID. The role's trust policy allows only Spotto, and only with your External ID. You never create access keys or share credentials. 2 AWS returns temporary credentials and Spotto checks they belong to the expected account. 3 Spotto makes read-only calls for resources, metrics, security findings and billing files. An explicit deny always wins over the role: a resource control policy can block the assume itself; a service control policy can block reads but never the assume, because Spotto is outside your organization; a permissions boundary caps what the role can do; and S3 bucket and KMS key policies must allow the role when another account owns the billing bucket, or the files use a customer-managed KMS key.

The trust policy is one statement: sts:AssumeRole from Spotto's AWS principal, with the condition sts:ExternalId. Your External ID starts with spotto-, is the same for all of your accounts and never changes.

What Spotto Reads, And What It Never Reads​

Discovery reads, allowed by ViewOnlyAccess, SecurityAudit and SpottoReadOnlyAccess in every account: resource configuration and tags, CloudWatch metrics and CloudTrail events, Security Hub, GuardDuty and Inspector findings, and Cost Explorer, Compute Optimizer and Trusted Advisor; never creating, changing or deleting resources, and never log events, table items, stream records, queue messages or container images. Generating an IAM credential report counts as a write in AWS but changes no credentials. Secrets and parameters, denied by SpottoReadOnlyAccess: names, rotation and other metadata, never Secrets Manager secret values, Systems Manager parameter values, instance passwords or console output. Data inside resources: EC2 user data and Lambda environment variables are readable because the scan needs them; database logs, pipeline job details, traces, vectors, CloudFormation template bodies and Lambda code are denied. S3: bucket names, policies and inventory configuration, never any object outside the billing export folder. Account information, from SecurityAudit: name, creation date and state, never contact details or email addresses. SpottoBillingExportRead: the chosen export definition and its delivery folder, never creating or changing exports, buckets or keys. SpottoCommitmentsPlanning: Reserved Instance and Savings Plans inventory, coverage, utilization and recommendations, never buying or changing commitments; starting a Savings Plans recommendation calculation counts as a write in AWS but only creates a recommendation, up to three times a day.Discovery reads, allowed by ViewOnlyAccess, SecurityAudit and SpottoReadOnlyAccess in every account: resource configuration and tags, CloudWatch metrics and CloudTrail events, Security Hub, GuardDuty and Inspector findings, and Cost Explorer, Compute Optimizer and Trusted Advisor; never creating, changing or deleting resources, and never log events, table items, stream records, queue messages or container images. Generating an IAM credential report counts as a write in AWS but changes no credentials. Secrets and parameters, denied by SpottoReadOnlyAccess: names, rotation and other metadata, never Secrets Manager secret values, Systems Manager parameter values, instance passwords or console output. Data inside resources: EC2 user data and Lambda environment variables are readable because the scan needs them; database logs, pipeline job details, traces, vectors, CloudFormation template bodies and Lambda code are denied. S3: bucket names, policies and inventory configuration, never any object outside the billing export folder. Account information, from SecurityAudit: name, creation date and state, never contact details or email addresses. SpottoBillingExportRead: the chosen export definition and its delivery folder, never creating or changing exports, buckets or keys. SpottoCommitmentsPlanning: Reserved Instance and Savings Plans inventory, coverage, utilization and recommendations, never buying or changing commitments; starting a Savings Plans recommendation calculation counts as a write in AWS but only creates a recommendation, up to three times a day.

AWS Managed Policies​

PolicyARNCovers
ViewOnlyAccessarn:aws:iam::aws:policy/job-function/ViewOnlyAccessLists and describes resources across services, much like Azure Reader
SecurityAuditarn:aws:iam::aws:policy/SecurityAuditReads security configuration, much like Azure Security Reader

AWS maintains both and adds new services over time, so new data Spotto collects rarely needs a role change. Spotto reviews each new version of these policies before relying on it, and checks the attached versions on every scan.

SpottoReadOnlyAccess​

A small inline policy. It allows only the reads the managed policies don't include, and denies data and secret reads they would otherwise allow.

What It Adds​

ServiceFor
Cost ExplorerCosts, forecasts and rightsizing
Compute OptimizerRightsizing recommendations
Resilience HubResilience assessments
Well-ArchitectedWorkload reviews
Trusted AdvisorRecommendations
Savings PlansCommitment inventory
Resource ExplorerResource search
Data ExportsFinding your billing exports and whether AWS has delivered their files (ListExports, GetExport, ListExecutions), metadata only
IAM Identity Center, LambdaUser and group details, Lambda aliases

What It Denies​

An explicit deny overrides both managed policies.

DataDenied actions
Secrets and parameterssecretsmanager:GetSecretValue, secretsmanager:BatchGetSecretValue, ssm:GetParameter, ssm:GetParameters, ssm:GetParameterHistory, ssm:GetParametersByPath, ssm:GetAutomationExecution
Keys and secrets inside configurationec2:DescribeVpnConnections, directconnect:DescribeVirtualInterfaces, glue:GetConnections, cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolClient, cognito-idp:DescribeIdentityProvider, appsync:ListApiKeys, apigateway:GET, cloudfront:GetDistribution, cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig, cloudfront:ListDistributions, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByWebACLId, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByRealtimeLogConfig, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByAnycastIpListId, cloudfront:ListDistributionsByConnectionMode
Instance passwords and console outputec2:GetPasswordData, ec2:GetConsoleOutput, ec2:GetConsoleScreenshot
Launch configuration user dataautoscaling:DescribeLaunchConfigurations
Database logs and queriesrds:DownloadDBLogFilePortion, rds:DownloadCompleteDBLogFile, redshift:ViewQueriesInConsole
Saved queries, scripts and codecleanrooms:GetAnalysisTemplate, cleanrooms:GetCollaborationAnalysisTemplate, cleanrooms:BatchGetCollaborationAnalysisTemplate, cleanrooms:GetProtectedQuery, cleanrooms:PreviewPrivacyImpact, logs:DescribeQueries, logs:DescribeQueryDefinitions, quicksight:DescribeDataSet, quicksight:DescribeAnalysis, quicksight:DescribeDashboard, quicksight:DescribeTemplate, appsync:ListResolvers, appsync:ListResolversByFunction, appsync:ListFunctions, appsync:GetChannelNamespace, appsync:ListChannelNamespaces, cloudfront:GetFunction, sagemaker:DescribeNotebookInstanceLifecycleConfig, sagemaker:DescribeStudioLifecycleConfig, sagemaker:DescribeHumanTaskUi, ssm:GetDocument, ssm:ListCommands, ssm:DescribeAutomationExecutions, ssm:DescribeAutomationStepExecutions, codecommit:ListFileCommitHistory, cloudformation:GetTemplate, lambda:GetFunction
AI prompts, agents and memorybedrock:GetPrompt, bedrock:GetAgent, bedrock:GetAgentVersion, bedrock:GetAgentCollaborator, bedrock:GetFlow, bedrock:GetFlowVersion, bedrock:GetExecutionFlowSnapshot, bedrock:GetKnowledgeBaseDocuments, bedrock-agentcore:GetEvaluator, bedrock-agentcore:GetHarness, bedrock-agentcore:GetMemory, bedrock-agentcore:GetRegistryRecord, bedrock-agentcore:GetConfigurationBundle, bedrock-agentcore:GetConfigurationBundleVersion, bedrock-mantle:CallWithBearerToken, qapps:GetQApp, qbusiness:ListDocuments
Messages and contact-centre datalex:GetUtterancesView, chime:ListChannelMessages, connect:ListRealtimeContactAnalysisSegments, connect:ListRealtimeContactAnalysisSegmentsV2, connect:ListContactReferences, connect:ListDataTableValues, connect:ListDataTablePrimaryValues, mobiletargeting:GetCampaigns, mechanicalturk:ListHITs
Documents, datasets, traces and exportssagemaker:DescribeModelCard, rekognition:ListDatasetEntries, cognito-sync:ListRecords, s3vectors:GetVectors, s3vectors:ListVectors, s3vectors:QueryVectors, xray:GetTraceSummaries, xray:BatchGetTraces, datapipeline:QueryObjects, datapipeline:DescribeObjects, datapipeline:EvaluateExpression, codepipeline:GetJobDetails, codepipeline:GetThirdPartyJobDetails, quicksight:DescribeAssetBundleExportJob, quicksight:DescribeDashboardSnapshotJobResult, devicefarm:ListArtifacts, devicefarm:ListTestGridSessionArtifacts
Security incident casessecurity-ir:GetCase, security-ir:ListCaseEdits, security-ir:ListComments, security-ir:GetCaseAttachmentDownloadUrl
Account contact detailsaccount:GetPrimaryEmail, account:GetAlternateContact, account:GetContactInformation
Cognito user listscognito-idp:ListUsers, cognito-idp:ListUsersInGroup

Spotto still reads metadata, such as secret names, rotation dates and parameter names.

The deny wins over everything else on the role, including security framework assessments. A framework check that would need one of these reads shows as not assessed rather than widening the role.

Neither managed policy grants data reads, so the role also can't read CloudWatch log events, DynamoDB items, Kinesis records, SQS messages, ECR image layers or S3 objects outside the billing export folder.

What Stays Readable​

Two kinds of configuration can hold secrets and remain readable, because the scan uses the APIs that return them:

DataReturned by
EC2 user dataec2:DescribeInstanceAttribute and ec2:DescribeLaunchTemplateVersions
Lambda environment variableslambda:ListFunctions

Don't store secrets in either. Use Secrets Manager or Parameter Store, which the role can't read.

Two reads are worth knowing about:

  • account:GetAccountInformation shows the native account name, creation date and state.
  • iam:GenerateCredentialReport counts as a write in AWS, but only starts an IAM credential report. It never creates or changes credentials.

S3 Objects​

Role deployed withS3 object reads
The hosted templates (Launch Stack, CloudShell, Terraform)No policy grants object reads outside the billing export folder. Neither managed policy grants s3:GetObject.
Role instructions from Manual SetupSpottoReadOnlyAccess also denies s3:GetObject* outside the billing export folder. Replace the whole policy when billing changes, because the deny's exception changes with it.

Billing Export Access​

SpottoBillingExportRead goes on the account that stores the export. For an existing export, Grant Access to Export adds the same reads as SpottoExistingBillingExportRead:

ActionScope
s3:GetBucketLocationThe bucket
s3:GetEncryptionConfigurationThe bucket; preflight must read its encryption settings before accepting a new or changed source.
s3:ListBucketOnly the delivery folder, <prefix>/<export name>, or the name alone without a prefix
s3:GetObjectFiles in that folder
kms:Decrypt, kms:DescribeKeyOnly the billing export's KMS key, and only when the export uses one. The key policy must also allow the role.

A legacy CUR also needs cur:DescribeReportDefinitions, which the role instructions add for its definition account. None of these permissions can create, change or delete exports, buckets or keys.

Before the first delivery, Spotto uses iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy on the storage role to check object-read grants and, for a customer-managed SSE-KMS key, key-decrypt grants. The bucket's encryption configuration must be readable and the actual key must resolve through read-only lookups; leaving the key field blank does not skip that check. An AWS-managed S3 key must already exist. Only the account's exact regional aws/s3 key can use the AWS-managed exception. Its decryption simulation rejects a simulated explicit deny; an implicit identity-policy deny can rely on the key's S3-mediated policy only when no Organizations or permissions-boundary restriction is reported. A reported restriction is inconclusive and blocks acceptance. Known S3 service and caller-account context is supplied; missing required simulation context blocks acceptance.

Simulation establishes policy readiness only. It doesn't prove access through S3 bucket policies, KMS key policies, resource control policies or VPC endpoint policies. A read of a delivered object tests actual access. See billing preflight.

Commitments Planning​

SpottoCommitmentsPlanning is always on the role in the management or standalone account deployed by the templates. With Manual Setup, it's added where you select Organization Commitments Planning.

ActionWhy
organizations:DescribeOrganizationConfirm the organization's identity
savingsplans:DescribeSavingsPlans, ec2:DescribeReservedInstancesCommitment inventory
ce:GetSavingsPlansCoverage, ce:GetSavingsPlansUtilization, ce:GetReservationCoverage, ce:GetReservationUtilizationCoverage and utilization
ce:GetSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendation, ce:GetReservationPurchaseRecommendationPurchase recommendations
ce:StartSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendationGeneration, ce:ListSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendationGenerationRefresh Savings Plans recommendations

AWS classes StartSavingsPlansPurchaseRecommendationGeneration as a write, because it starts a new calculation. It doesn't buy a Savings Plan or change a commitment. AWS allows it up to three times a day per billing family.

SpottoReadOnlyAccess also includes ce:GetCostForecast, for native cost forecasts, and ce:GetDimensionValues, to qualify Savings Plan types.

Optional Storage Inventory Report Access​

Storage Inventory assessment reads an existing S3 Inventory report. It doesn't read your application objects or create an Inventory configuration. It's not in the standard role, so add it in the tool that owns the role:

PermissionScope
s3:GetInventoryConfigurationThe source bucket
s3:ListBucketLimited by s3:prefix to the report's destination folder
s3:GetObjectOnly that folder's manifests and report data
kms:DecryptThe exact key, if the report uses SSE-KMS. The key policy must allow the role.

A report in another account's bucket also needs that bucket's policy to allow the role. For a role from Manual Setup, also add the report folder to the S3 deny's exception: a separate Allow can't override a deny. Never grant broad object reads.

Update An Existing Role​

Role deployed withHow to update
The hosted templatesSee update and repair: rerun the CloudShell command, update the stack, or bump the Terraform module.
A downloaded templateDownload the account's new template and update its stack.
Manual IAMGenerate the role instructions again and replace each policy.

A role missing ViewOnlyAccess or SecurityAudit shows Update Available or Repair Access. Update the stack, or attach the missing policy to a manual role. If an older role has AWS ReadOnlyAccess attached, detach it once the current policies work: it grants much broader reads, including S3 objects.

What Can Still Block Access​

An IAM Allow never overrides an explicit deny. Resource control policies (RCPs), service control policies (SCPs), permissions boundaries, S3 bucket policies and KMS key policies can all stop Spotto even when the role is correct. See the trust policy diagram.

Scope any exception to the exact SpottoReadOnlyRole ARNs rather than relaxing the control for everyone. Spotto reports denied reads per account, so you can see what's affected.

Spotto Portal Permissions Are Separate​

AWS IAM controls what Spotto can read. Spotto permissions control who in your company can see the data and manage cloud accounts. See access and permissions.